The Political Economy of the Transition from Logging to Mining in Solomon Islands by Porter, Doug & Allen, Matthew
SSGM DISCUSSION PAPER 2015/12
The Political Economy of the Transition  
from Logging to Mining in Solomon Islands
DOUG PORTER AND MATTHEW ALLEN
State, Society & Governance in Melanesia  ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au
Introduction
Solomon Islanders have more than four decades of 
experience with large-scale commercial logging of 
natural forests, which still accounts for around 70 
per cent of exports, 15 per cent of GDP and 14 per 
cent of domestically sourced government revenues 
(World Bank 2015:139). However, having logged well 
beyond the sustainable yield almost every year since 
1981, and despite previous predictions of the exhaus-
tion of the resource having proved to be incorrect, 
there are signs that logging is set to decline. For 
example, in 2012 there were 102 active licensed log-
ging operations, down from 333 in 2008, and these 
are now mostly restricted to three of the nine prov-
inces — Isabel, Makira Ulawa and Western. 
The logging industry in Solomon Islands has 
been so tightly imbricated with the evolution of the 
nation’s post-colonial politics that the two could be 
said to be mutually constituted (see, for example, 
Allen 2011; Bennett 2000; Dauvergne 1998/9; Frazer 
1997; Kabutaulaka 2000, 2006; URS Corporation 
2006; Wairiu 2007). Benefits of logging have typical-
ly been captured by foreign, mostly Malaysian, com-
panies and national-level politicians. The logging 
companies and their political allies have significantly 
weakened the state’s ability to regulate the industry 
or to resist the sale of a valuable resource for a frac-
tion of its real value. Regulatory interventions are 
very rare, and not because of the loggers’ excellent 
operational standards. Sightings of forestry officials 
away from Honiara ostensibly on duty are unusual, 
and greeted with surprise. Moreover, the windfalls 
reaped by loggers have been at the expense of land-
owners and government revenue.1 Although some 
responsible local leaders have put the proceeds of 
logging to good use, these instances have been vastly 
outnumbered by the cleavages generated by dis-
putes about timber rights, the spending of logging 
revenue, environmental degradation and the piti-
fully small payments made locally. Several informed 
observers believe that the nexus between logging and 
politics was an important factor in the conflict that 
beset Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003 (see 
Allen 2013a; Bennett 2000; Hameiri 2009).2
While logging will continue in some form and 
scale for many years to come, scholars and policy-
makers are paying increasing attention to the pos-
sibility that Solomon Islands’ economic future lies in 
large-scale mining (Haque 2013; Tagini 2014). With 
this transition in mind, the Solomon Islands Gov-
ernment (SIG), led by the Democratic Coalition for 
Change, which came to power following the nation-
al election of November 2014, has flagged a com 
prehensive review of the current mining policy and 
legislative framework. The anticipation of a mining 
future is not unwarranted. Although the Gold Ridge 
mine has been closed since April 2014, its new  
owners, a company associated with ‘landowners’,  
are keen to get it restarted. Pending the outcome  
of a Court of Appeal review, nickel mining could  
commence on Isabel as soon as the end of 2015. 
Moreover, bauxite mining has been taking place  
on Rennell since 2014 and there is strong interest  
in bauxite on Waghina and in Temotu, nickel on  
Choiseul, and gold and copper on Guadalcanal and  
in Western Province. Indeed, extensive prospecting  
and exploration activities are taking place across  
the archipelago. A tenement schedule obtained 
from the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Energy, 
dated 19 April 2013, listed 183 current, pending or 
recently expired prospecting licences, including 110 
licences for offshore (seabed) prospecting. 
It remains very difficult to predict the respec-
tive contributions that logging and 
mining will make to the Solomon 
Islands economy in the coming 
years. That said, we proceed here 
from the assumption that logging 
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appears to be on the wane at the same time that 
there has been a marked intensification of activity in 
the mining sector. The Discussion Paper therefore 
asks two related questions: What might be the polit-
ical economic effects of an expansion in large-scale 
mining? And what could be learned from logging 
that might be relevant to mining? Although min-
ing and logging are different in many ways, which 
we shall discuss, we argue that mining will amplify 
three issues already familiar from logging, namely, 
i) disputes around the deal-making process, ii) 
problems of local social order, and iii) longstanding 
grievances about how revenues are shared and spent. 
Further, whilst a suite of technical measures may be 
available to address, if not resolve, these inherently 
political issues, it is by no means clear that Solomon 
Islands’ political economy will be conducive to their 
careful consideration, let alone subsequent adoption. 
Our analysis draws upon and integrates two 
political economy frameworks that have been 
recently applied to Solomon Islands and Melanesia 
more widely. The first, developed by Craig and Por-
ter (2014), musters comparative literature on politi-
cal settlements (for example Khan 2010) and the 
ordering of power (for example Slater 2010) to argue 
that the transience and shallowness of pacts between 
political and economic elites in Solomon Islands 
creates incentives for members of parliament (MPs) 
to pursue short-term political alliances and paro-
chial agendas — most obviously through the instru-
ment of constituency funds — rather than investing 
in political parties and ‘liberal’ institutions. This 
dynamic is inimical to the formation and implemen-
tation of coherent and consistent public policy. 
The political settlement framework provides the 
encompassing institutional context in which a more 
particular, and closely related, political economy of 
extractive resource industries unfolds. Hence the sec-
ond framework, proposed by Allen (2013b), draws 
upon research on Nigeria (Watts 2004, 2005) and 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Filer 1997) to demon-
strate that Melanesia’s extractive industries — espe-
cially large-scale mining and oil and gas — create 
contentious politics that are fundamentally spatial-
ised, or in other words, a contentious ‘politics of scale’, 
and have the potential to produce violent conflict. 
Contention plays out within and between three ‘gov-
ernable spaces’ (described by Watts as particular con-
figurations of resources, territory, power and identity 
that are hierarchically scaled): customary landown-
ership, indigeneity, and nationalism. In the context 
of Solomon Islands, and indeed Island Melanesia 
more widely, the space or scale of the island-province 
comes into stark relief as a platform for both politi-
cal mobilisation and internal disputation, prompting 
us to replace, for the purposes of this discussion, the 
space of indigeneity with the space of ‘islandism’  
(following Wittersheim 2003) (see Allen 2015).
The experience to date with large-scale min-
ing in Solomon Islands provides ample illustration 
of the precepts of this political economy approach 
(see Baines 2015 for a useful summary of this expe-
rience). At Gold Ridge we have witnessed intense 
disputation, exclusion and fragmentation within 
the space of landownership. The recent and conten-
tious acquisition of the mine by ‘landowners’ speaks 
both to these tensions and the increasing power of 
landowners vis-a-vis both the provincial and the 
national government. That said, Gold Ridge contin-
ues to feature prominently in longstanding claims 
for greater autonomy for Guadalcanal Province; in 
other words, disputation between the province and 
the national government centred around questions 
of benefit-sharing. In recent years the operation has 
been plagued by a succession of corruption scandals 
including allegations of improper payments made 
to an MP by one of its previous owners and, more 
recently, serious anomalies in the management and 
disbursement of a large tranche of landowner royal-
ties on the part of relevant SIG ministries. 
On Choiseul and Isabel we see increasing ten-
sions between all three governable spaces (i.e. land-
ownership, islandism and nationalism). In both 
cases, island-level institutions and associations that 
merge formal government, kastom and church to 
create hybrid institutions oppose mining, but land-
owners support it, at least those of them who stand 
to benefit. Moreover, in the case of Isabel, there is 
evidence of corrupt dealings having taken place 
between one of the companies that is vying for a 
mining lease and relevant national-level authorities, 
as well as of inducements having been paid to land-
owners. Corruption is also evident in the bauxite 
mining that has been taking place on Rennell, with 
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extensive allegations of bribes and inducements 
being paid, again by two rival companies, to land-
owners and relevant national authorities, and the 
direct involvement of politicians in corrupt deal-
ings. Tensions surrounding the mining on Rennell 
have witnessed a revival of a longstanding but dor-
mant separatist agenda for Renbel Province.
What can we make of these developments, espe-
cially when we read them against the much longer 
history of logging? First, there are salient and worry-
ing continuities between the political economies of 
mining and logging, especially with regard to ‘pact-
ing’ between political elites and corporate actors, 
both generically and via commonalities in person-
alities. This suggests that the ‘habitus’ of the logging 
political economy has created a path-dependency 
that is shaping and being reproduced by the emerg-
ing mining political economy. Second, this continu-
ity means that the nature of the political settlement 
in Solomon Islands is likely to remain more or less 
intact under a mining future. It will also mean that 
the state will struggle to deal with the intensified 
spatialised contestations that are likely to attend a 
large-scale mining future, just as it has struggled 
to regulate the logging industry. While an array of 
reforms would present ways to tackle these contes-
tations, ultimately we are sceptical about the likeli-
hood that Solomon Islands’ political or economic 
elites will invest in them and concerned about the 
prospect of a return to violence at the intersection 
of landowner disintegration and provincial-national 
government tensions over benefit-sharing.
Section 1: What Problems Do People  
Associate with Logging? 
It is useful to start by summarising the problems 
that Solomon Islanders associate with logging. A 
study released in 2013 called ‘Justice Delivered 
Locally’ (JDL) talked with hundreds of people 
across five provinces and found that, whether seen 
through the eyes of villagers who hold the right 
to decide on logging or those who simply live in 
the area, logging deals usually fall short in two key 
ways (Allen et al. 2013). First, there is often no 
match between the deal agreed between landowners 
and logging companies and what actually happens 
afterward. Rarely are promises about roads, hous-
ing, clinics, and local employment formally written 
into the agreement, which is perhaps not surprising 
given that even the more educated landowners who 
sign the deal often do not fully appreciate its ‘lega-
lese’. Second, short of direct action to disrupt the 
logging operation, there are few opportunities to 
do anything about this disparity. This is especially 
important because problems that tend to have been 
underplayed when the deal is made — such as dis-
ruption to water courses, rivalry within the tribe, 
domestic violence, sexual exploitation, or other 
problems — prove to be much bigger than com-
munities can deal with. Yet the real grievance is that 
once the deal is done, it is very difficult to ensure 
that it is monitored or that it can be amended — or 
in fact to take any kind of corrective action — and 
all too soon, the trees are gone. These two issues 
stem from how the deal is negotiated and managed, 
and how the market transaction is regulated. 
The disputes that arise from these shortcom-
ings bleed into a range of social order problems. The 
JDL study found that logging is the ‘most significant 
determinant of community cohesion and harmony’ 
(Allen et al. 2013:xi). Other researchers have also doc-
umented the intense social impacts of logging (see, 
for example, Hviding forthcoming; Lummis 2010; 
Scales 2003; Wairiu and Nanau n.d.). Social order 
problems include the production and abuse of drugs 
and alcohol, increased violence, and the disintegra-
tion of long-standing norms about marriage, land 
tenure, and obligations between men and women 
and between youths and elders. Many disputes can 
be traced to the payment and distribution of logging 
royalties, rents, or access fees. When chiefs and local 
leaders become directly engaged in substance abuse, 
violence, and logging-related disputes, the social 
order problems can worsen. Thus, it is not just that 
toxic community disputes produce significant discon-
tentment or worse, but people are also left feeling that 
important institutions such as the chiefs deserve less 
trust and respect. This is why people often say that 
local institutions are ‘broken’ — not working and no 
longer regarded as legitimate (Allen et al. 2013). 
Grievances about the lack of access to jobs, 
cash, or benefits from logging persist in families and 
communities well beyond the logging operation. In 
fact, a sense of injustice about who gets jobs, where 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm4                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Doug Porter and Matthew Allen
public spending is directed, or how opportunities 
are distributed is high on the list of problems that 
triggered the ethnic tension of 1998–2003 (see, for 
example, Allen 2013a; Kabutaulaka 2001). National 
government officials are frank about the ways that 
corruption, exemptions from tax and customs rules, 
and a lack of basic discipline in the civil service have 
undermined the government’s ability to collect the 
revenue that logging should generate. These same 
officials go on to claim that this is a primary reason 
that there is not enough money to ensure that log-
ging deals are effectively checked or monitored or 
that the benefits and costs are fairly spread around 
through social services such as health care or roads. 
This argument does not stand up to some basic 
evidence, however, as the Solomon Islands Govern-
ment spends slightly more on government than the 
average for other small island developing economies 
(International Monetary Fund 2014:21, figure 4), 
even though people often complain that government 
is absent from their lives.
Many Solomon Islanders have concluded that 
the logging industry has moulded government to 
function in a particular fashion and distorted rela-
tionships between political leaders, civil servants, 
and citizens in ways that will be difficult to reform. 
Many have stories about how logging industry per-
sonalities and money impact on elections, how gov-
ernments are formed after election day (and voted 
out before their time is up), and how the bribing 
and ‘treating’ of MPs and civil servants have eroded 
the ability of government to balance and respond to 
competing pressures, such as the need to encourage 
foreign investment while also ensuring that deals 
are fair, resources are managed sustainably, and  
revenues due are collected and distributed in ways 
that serve the national interest. The direct involve-
ment of MPs as directors of logging companies is 
also widely known and has been well documented.3
Politicians are acutely aware that loggers can 
create great political instability, both as indi-
vidual logging companies and through the influ-
ential voice of the Solomon Islands Forest Indus-
tries Association (SIFIA).4 But at the same time, 
relationships between the logging industry and 
political leaders are characteristically shallow and 
unstable, as they are typically based on cash pay-
ments as opposed to stronger social ties through 
marriage, ethnicity, or political parties, resulting in 
agreements that weaken quickly and need constant 
revisiting and ‘refueling’ (Craig and Porter 2014). 
This, in turn, contributes to the weakness of politi-
cal parties, which are unable to discipline members. 
It also means that leaders have even fewer incen-
tives to act on the high-level policy commitments 
they so frequently make to improve government 
machinery (see Cruz and Keefer 2013). Thus, it is 
not surprising that very little has been achieved 
from the many efforts made to reform government 
and to positively reshape relations between elected 
leaders, civil servants, and citizens. 
Section 2: Logging and Mining: Points of  
Similarity and Difference
It is important to consider how the similarities and 
differences between logging and mining activities 
are likely to impact on the issues outlined above and 
perhaps raise new issues of concern. Logging and 
mining are different in three important ways: the 
particular nature of the mining industry, how the 
‘community’ relates to it, and the implications that 
both of these factors will have for the government. 
The nature of the mining industry 
Logging operations occur in a relatively small area for 
a short period of time, but because they are numer-
ous and dispersed, they are inherently difficult to 
regulate and monitor. They share a common busi-
ness model and corporate structure, involve low cap-
ital investments, and obligate the state only indirectly. 
By contrast, the kinds of mining operations foresee-
able in Solomon Islands are likely to be few in num-
ber (perhaps two to three new mines over the next 
decade) and thus the direct impacts concentrated in 
a few places. These mines will typically require large 
capital investments and operations will be planned to 
cover a comparatively long time.5 Mining companies 
are more diverse in their corporate arrangements and 
business models, and the state, in its capacity as the 
owner of subsurface mineral resources, has far greater 
obligations in mining operations. 
While some mining companies, particularly 
those that are publicly listed, could be expected to 
be better ‘corporate citizens’ than the typical logging 
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company that has operated in Solomon Islands, the 
evidence to date suggests otherwise. A 2014 High 
Court judgment found that Sumitomo Metal Min-
ing Co. Ltd — a multinational company listed on the 
Tokyo stock exchange — through its local subsidiary 
engaged in a raft of questionable dealings with both 
landowners and SIG officials in relation to nickel ten-
ements on Isabel including improperly influencing 
landowners to sign Surface Access Agreements and 
suborning an official of the Department of Mines 
and Energy (SMM Solomon Ltd v Attorney General;  
Bugotu Minerals Ltd v Attorney General [2014] 
SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 258 of 2011:54–67). There is 
also evidence that one of the previous operators of 
Gold Ridge mine — Australian Solomons Gold, an 
ASX listed company — offered cash inducements to 
landowners (Burton and Filer 2006); whilst another, 
Allied Gold, also ASX listed, faces allegations of mak-
ing improper payments to a member of parliament 
(PNGIndustryNews.net 6/10/2014). 
In comparison to logging, a mining operation has 
a much larger footprint, as it includes the mine, tail-
ings disposal systems, port and power facilities, and 
transport and supply chains. These are linked to glob-
al commodity markets, capital flows and financing, 
and insurance and corporate arrangements. There 
are, therefore, multiple points at which the mining 
operation can be challenged and which, from the 
perspective of the company, will need to be protect-
ed from a variety of threats: from disgruntled land-
owners to rival companies, fluctuations in their share 
price, and corporate takeover bids. To protect their 
interests and being aware of the costs to long-term 
profitability, mining companies prioritise stability and 
the need to avoid local contestation and conflict. To 
achieve these ends, they can muster enormous tech-
nical capacity, political influence, and experience.
Although logging has been more prevalent and 
has touched many Solomon Islanders, the scale and 
duration of a single mine is likely to have even more 
profound impacts over a much longer period of 
time. Any one large mine is likely to mobilise island-
level politics, as well as province-level dynamics with 
the centre, in ways that have a greater impact than 
the larger number of dispersed logging operations. 
Compared to logging, there will be plenty of time 
in the mining process for grievances to grow and 
fester and for the various actors involved to become 
savvy players. Whether this prompts investments by 
all parties in stable institutions that are sufficiently 
flexible and respected to debate and resolve issues 
inclusively remains open to question. We will return 
to this in closing; however, it is already apparent that 
new mining ventures are underscoring a compel-
ling need to resolve longstanding grievances about 
the roles of national, provincial, and local authorities 
and to ameliorate the inevitably uneven spread of  
the benefits and costs of mining. 
Compared to logging, these new large-scale 
mining operations could — depending on the 
nature of the deal — result in a much larger volume 
of revenues flowing to government and, in prin-
ciple, this could finance more effective regulation 
of the interface between communities and min-
ing operations, and service delivery at large. At the 
same time, mining investors will seek from gov-
ernment guarantees that it will protect their assets 
and operations by providing the services required 
to support them as well as the needs of the com-
munity affected by them. Yet in few cases are gov-
ernments able to respond with the speed or quality 
needed to meet miners’ expectations or community 
demands — this is especially the case where gov-
ernments are already struggling to reach evenly 
across their territory, or are transitioning from peri-
ods of conflict or chronic instability. 
In response, mining companies could begin to 
take on the functions of government. With security 
and the continuity of operations paramount, mining 
(and other resource-extraction) companies often 
directly engage private security firms to police their  
mine sites and also fund and implement community  
development projects or augment school or health 
clinic budgets.6 Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
large numbers of the national police or military to 
be moonlighting for resource companies, and some-
times, as in the Indonesian province of Papua, lucra-
tive security contracts are awarded to elements in 
the police and military. Moreover, mining companies 
can become involved in local dispute resolution by 
employing staff or contractors with de facto powers 
not unlike those of colonial district officers. Experi-
ence from natural resource–rich countries like Nige-
ria show that these actions by global corporations 
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can seriously disrupt the prospect of democratic 
politics and accountability (Watts 2005, 2007). Nige-
ria exemplifies a durable, crisis prone system, but 
one that has a powerful ability to reproduce itself 
through the operation of two capabilities that have 
been financed by natural resource wealth: state coer-
cion (the ability and willingness of the security forces 
to intervene and to ‘restore order’), and networks of 
patrimonialism and elite rent-seeking (through which 
it is possible to selectively mollify dissent and manu-
facture consent by ensuring networked access to and  
control over state revenues) (Joab-Peterside et al. 2012). 
The nature of ‘community’: rights of ownership, 
community, and citizenship
The comparatively larger scale of mining is matched 
by greater expectations about economic benefits, 
and the pressures people often feel to conclude log-
ging deals quickly will be no different in the case of 
mining. In Solomon Islands, a combination of high 
rainfall, hilly geography, and limited arable land, 
coupled with very high costs of internal transport 
to markets, restricts other commercial agricultural 
opportunities (see World Bank 2010). Even when 
people are well aware of the downsides of logging,  
when pressed for cash for school fees, health costs, 
and a growing list of modern household foodstuffs 
and goods, they can feel compelled to seize an oppor-
tunity when it comes and more quickly accept the 
terms on offer. Exactly the same process has been 
described in relation to mining projects in different 
parts of Melanesia (see Filer and Macintyre 2006). 
The prospect that mining will produce even 
more benefits, especially in the form of royalties, 
flowing to more actors for a longer time, is likely to 
intensify the types of intra-group conflicts that are 
already familiar from logging. This competition will 
prompt the emergence of a raft of new and recon-
figured local territorial and community identities — 
as has been experienced elsewhere, for instance, in 
Nigeria, in the form of ‘oil host communities’, a vari-
ety of forms of local government entities, chiefdoms, 
‘minorities’, and so on. New groups will appear to 
claim benefits, and existing groups will fragment 
(see, for example, Allen 2013b; Bainton 2009; Bal-
lard and Banks 2003; Banks 2008), as has already 
been evident around Gold Ridge mine and the pro-
posed Tina River Hydro scheme. Filer (1997) has 
shown how these dynamics are driven by an ‘ideol-
ogy of customary landownership’ that is manipu-
lated by powerful men in order to capture economic 
benefits, usually at the expense of other members of 
their landholding groups. We can anticipate that a 
mining future will intensify disputes about how ben-
efits are shared within groups and that social order 
conflicts between the younger and older generations, 
and between men and women, will become more 
marked. Scholars have pointed to this kind of local-
ised disputation and social disintegration as impor-
tant factors in the origins of the 10-year conflict on 
Bougainville (Filer 1990), as well as the ethnic ten-
sion in Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2001; Naitoro 
2000). They also contribute to ongoing instability 
and insecurity in peri-urban areas such Kakabona to 
the west of Honiara (Monson forthcoming).
In the case of Gold Ridge, interviews conducted 
by the second author in January 2015 indicate a stark 
marginalisation of women within the space of cus-
tomary landownership. There are no women on the 
executives of any of the three Gold Ridge landowner 
associations, and while some women are signatories 
on tribal royalty accounts, the women interviewed 
(including from the Guadalcanal Council of Women) 
were unanimous in the view that royalty payments 
are controlled by men and are frequently squan-
dered on consumables, including alcohol. The recent 
transfer of the mine from St Barbara to Gold Ridge 
Community Investment Limited (GCIL), a company 
associated with ‘landowners’, could lead to further 
disputation within the space of landownership. The 
chairman of Gold Ridge Community Landowner 
Council, which represents landowning tribes in the 
mine lease area, has been reported as stating that he 
refused to sign-off on the Deed of Sale because the 
process was rushed and the correct decision-making 
forum was bypassed (Radio NZ 11/5/2015). The chair 
of the Kolobisi Tailings Dam Association, which rep-
resents landowning tribes in the vicinity of the tail-
ings dam, has also publicly disassociated himself from 
the sale (SIBC 6/5/2015). These developments do not 
augur well for a smooth reopening of the mine — the 
declared objective of GCIL’s Board of Directors whose 
chairman, a former minister for mines in the national 
government, has stated that a ‘partner investor’ has 
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already been identified (Solomon Star 3/5/2015).
Competition will intensify fragmentation at 
the local level, but it is also likely to see new politi-
cal communities being incubated at the scale of the 
island-province and which will come into tension 
with the scale of the nation. In the past, Solomon 
Islanders have been successful at using different 
ideologies — such as kastom, Christianity, class, or 
indigeneity — as potent ways to resist pressure from 
outsiders or to advance their own claims or concerns 
(see Allen 2013a:61–102). These ideologies have 
been mobilised at the scale of the island, making the 
island a potent, albeit internally contested, platform 
for collective action.7 The desire to capture a greater 
share of the benefits that flow from extractive indus-
tries on Guadalcanal has underpinned a longstand-
ing agenda for greater autonomy, expressed as ‘state-
hood’ for Guadalcanal, under a new federal constitu-
tion. This autonomy agenda was prominent in the 
‘bone fide’ grievances of the ‘indigenous people of 
Guadalcanal’ that came to the fore during the ethnic 
tension and it features strongly in the narratives of 
ex-militants from Guadalcanal (Allen 2013a). These 
scalar dynamics are by no means unique to Guadal-
canal. For instance, grievances associated with baux-
ite mining on Rennell are reviving a dormant sepa-
ratist agenda for Renbel Province whose population 
are predominantly Polynesian and have long seen 
themselves as culturally separate from the rest of 
Solomon Islands (see Hughes and Tuhanuku 2015). 
The state as representative, owner of the resource, 
and distributor of public wealth
The central government in Solomon Islands formal-
ly has only a limited role in logging due to forestry 
laws that allow direct dealing between landowners 
and loggers. Nevertheless, as noted above, it is also 
the case that logging activities in the country have 
exposed the inability of the government to balance 
its conflicting interests and obligations to generate 
revenue, ensure deals are fair to all parties involved, 
manage resources sustainably, protect the interests 
of future generations, and govern transparently. 
As the owner of minerals, the national govern-
ment has an additional and much greater stake in 
mining. Its stake will be contested by both landown-
ers and provincial governments, and it is likely that 
new mining activities will fuel longstanding debates 
in Solomon Islands about the devolution of power. 
It is impossible to know in advance what sorts of 
governance arrangements will emerge from this 
mix, and these will vary between provinces, but the 
prominent role that kastom institutions, such as the 
Isabel House of Chiefs and the Lauru Tribal Land 
Conference in Choiseul, are taking in current min-
ing negotiations alongside their provincial govern-
ments points to the likelihood that island- and/or 
province-level political agendas will be shaped in 
part by these kinds of bodies. The authors’ inter-
views indicate that in both of these cases there are 
salient tensions between the scale of landownership, 
where there is strong support for proposed nickel 
mining from landowner representatives, and the 
scale of the island-province where both formal and 
informal governance actors are, at best, ambivalent 
about the prospect of large-scale mining. 
Pressure will also likely mount on the national 
government to ensure that the revenue it is enti-
tled to is collected and redistributed according 
to the principles of ‘derivation’ and ‘equalisation’. 
There is a fundamental tension between the two. 
The derivation principle is used to argue that rev-
enues be channelled back to the location — that 
is, the province — from where they came. By con-
trast, the equalisation principle requires that differ-
ences between provinces in terms of their capacity 
to raise revenue, their standards of living, and the 
costs of service delivery are taken into account in 
the formula used to determine the distribution of 
revenue. As mentioned above, these tensions can 
animate collective action — with potentially violent 
outcomes — at the scale of the island-province.
The ways in which the benefits flow back to citi-
zens will be a source of contestation. Nationally and 
provincially elected representatives will likely seize 
on opportunities to increase the size of flows to their 
Constituency Development Funds, just as provincial 
governments are also likely to make demands for a 
share of government revenue/government services. 
Section 3: What are the Implications?  
Lessons and Priorities 
Despite important differences, new mining ven-
tures will likely give rise to problems already famil-
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iar from logging. These problems will relate to the 
three areas discussed above, namely: the disputes 
when business transactions are being negotiated and 
monitored over time; the problems of social order 
that tend to be intensified around mining opera-
tions; and the difficulties and tensions associated 
with gathering and distributing the revenue and 
other benefits generated by the industry.
New and innovative approaches will be needed 
to deal with these kinds of problems. After all, each 
of these concerns was anticipated in the early 1980s 
just as the surge in logging began, and there have 
been many efforts to reform the forestry sector and 
deal with the logging industry’s impacts. For exam-
ple, for many years the Solomon Islands Govern-
ment partnered with the Australian Government on 
the Forestry Management Program to strengthen 
the policy and legal framework and build the insti-
tutional capacity of Solomon Islands’ Forestry Divi-
sion, including its licensing and enforcement func-
tions. However, the Independent Completion Report 
of the second and final phase of the program con-
cluded that it ‘fell short of its aims and the expecta-
tions of its supporters’ (Hughes et al. 2010:26). The 
report situated its shortcomings in a longer history 
of failed attempts to ‘fix’ the Solomon Islands for-
estry sector. According to the report:
It was very apparent that (the project) was an 
Australian-sponsored intervention into the gov-
ernance of a highly politicised and deeply cor-
rupted sector of the SI [Solomon Islands] econ-
omy. For over twenty years repeated attempts 
had been made to inject sound management 
and strong technical parameters into SI forest 
policy … These had largely failed, leaving only 
traces of their efforts in discarded policy papers, 
unenforced regulations, and a few long-serving 
FD [government forestry] staff who remem-
bered better days. (Hughes et al. 2010:6)
Nevertheless, there are some key lessons to be 
drawn from efforts such as these to reform pub-
lic sector agencies, especially those responsible for 
‘revenue-rich’ activities involving the administration 
of forestry, land, or other natural resources. First is 
to recognise that the kinds of problems experienced 
with logging are inherent to the process of commod-
ifying natural resources and governing economies 
and societies that rely on exploiting this transaction. 
In other words, there is not a great deal to be gained 
by assuming that the issues are simply technical, or 
that they can be ‘fixed’ once and for all by sorting 
out the policies and regulations governing the whole 
sector, whether forestry or, looking ahead, mining. 
This point has often been made but needs repeat-
ing. For instance, the recent annual independent 
assessment of the Solomon Islands–Australia Part-
nership for Development highlighted ‘the worrying 
persistence’ of a focus on the top end of central gov-
ernment systems and on the resolution of technical 
issues that, though important, may not flow through 
to results on the ground (Bazeley et al. 2013:3). 
What is needed, therefore, is to find a set of 
institutional arrangements that over time become 
recognised and accepted as legitimate and an effec-
tive means by which people can discuss, bargain 
and negotiate, and agree and disagree on an ongo-
ing basis on how to sort out the problems that 
mining will inevitably continue to generate. The 
approach taken to get to this point will be important 
— it needs a clear focus on a few key problem areas, 
rather than getting lost in ‘whole-of-government’ 
reforms; a good knowledge of the specific block-
ages to delivering results that are meaningful to 
people (instead of vague assertions about the need 
for ‘civil service reform’); and it requires a readiness 
to experiment, sometimes on a case-by-case basis. 
It is also clear from experience that without such 
opportunities and venues for contesting and reach-
ing agreements, people are likely to resort to actions 
— including violence, as has occurred in the case 
of logging — that destroy the possibility of gaining 
equitable benefits from natural resource develop-
ment. We summarise below three areas in need of 
urgent attention. But while the approach taken to 
garnering and maintaining political attention will be 
key to progress, we are far less sanguine about the 
prospect that the nature of the political settlements 
characteristic of Solomon Islands will be amenable 
to a positive trajectory on any of these three issues. 
Landowner identification and representation in 
mining negotiations and operations
Effective local-level engagement will be critical to 
the success of any mining deal in Solomon Islands. 
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This is of course precisely where the differences 
and power imbalances between players are most 
obvious. Generally speaking, mining companies, 
with formidable negotiating experience, can draw 
from wells of information and technical advice and 
have considerable financial resources to use to their 
advantage. In such negotiating dynamics, small, 
local-level players can be easily mollified, included 
in uneven or exclusive ways that prove to be locally 
divisive, or shut out completely. 
Two remedies are commonly combined to 
respond to the inherent power imbalances and the 
shifting local dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. 
One is to create flexible rather than fixed forms of 
institutions to handle contestation over time. Gov-
ernments and investors — particularly in the oil 
and gas industry — have in the past tended to want 
to limit and ‘fix’ ahead of time the institutional 
arrangement through which landowners are recog-
nised and represented in negotiations. An example 
is the Incorporated Land Group used in Papua New 
Guinea’s oil and gas sector that has proven to be an 
arrangement that works for those members of the 
community who are included within the defined 
group by enabling them to control the distribution 
of benefits, but at the same time has proved to be 
contentious because it limits the number of poten-
tially legitimate beneficiaries and has been subject to 
extensive fraud. The same kinds of issues can arise 
through another popular instrument, the Commu-
nity Development Agreement (CDA). The CDA can 
usefully bring landowners and government together, 
but if treated as fixed agreements, rather than open 
to renegotiation and revision, they can also con-
strain rather than facilitate ongoing dialogue, and 
foreclose rather than allow for changes in the parties 
involved (such as new company owners, local claim-
ants, or political representatives). 
The Ok Tedi mine in PNG and the Ahafo mine 
in Ghana present some examples of good practice 
in the way CDAs can be used to support a process 
of agreement-making amongst landowners, affected 
communities, government and investors, including 
the crucial aspect of identifying landowners, but 
also negotiating access to jobs, education, business 
or other opportunities. While the implementation 
of the 2007 Community Mine Continuation Agree-
ments for the OK Tedi mine has been mixed, the 
process afforded women an unprecedented seat at 
the negotiating table, with women’s rights to ben-
efits and entitlements effectively enshrined in a 
legally enforceable agreement (Menzies and Harley 
2012). A second purpose is often served simultane-
ously through agreement-making processes or is 
introduced in tandem, namely special arrangements 
to ensure free and informed consent by the local 
parties to negotiations and ongoing operations. A 
current review of experience in Rennell by Hughes 
and Tuhanuku (2015) led them to a two-pronged 
proposition that included: a ‘centre for advice on 
resource negotiations’ that would provide local 
parties with critical information about markets, 
agreements and so forth; and legislation that would 
ensure that no agreement in respect of the owner-
ship and use of nature resources would be legally 
enforceable unless the national (including the ‘com-
munity’) side in the negotiations had accessed a 
stipulated level of independently verifiable informa-
tion about the deal proposed. 
National arrangements to share public revenue 
for equity and to mitigate conflict 
Mining deals and operations tend to heighten two 
kinds of contests, one about how the wealth gener-
ated should be shared across generations, another 
about how other citizens, those not directly part of 
the benefit-sharing agreement around the mining 
operation, will also be able to benefit. Both kinds 
of disputes are well known in Solomon Islands, 
and many people are aware how they were (mis)
handled in Bougainville in PNG. Many are also 
aware of neighbouring country efforts to create 
durable forums for debates about how to represent 
the interests of future generations — Timor Leste’s 
Petroleum Fund, and PNG’s Minerals Resource 
Stabilisation Fund established in 1975, and, more 
recently, a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
Arrangements to share revenue amongst the 
current generation of citizens in ways that both 
acknowledge where revenues are derived from (the 
‘derivation’ principle, mentioned earlier), and also 
take into account the relative needs of people else-
where in the country (‘equalisation’) are amongst the 
most neglected aspects of public policy in Solomon 
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Islands since the ethnic tension. New large-scale 
mining ventures will make these disputes more pro-
nounced, but, here again, there are numerous exam-
ples from elsewhere of how nations have dealt with 
these challenges by introducing subnational reve-
nue-sharing arrangements through which to focus 
political debate around these issues. Closely related 
is the question of the powers, functions and resourc-
es mandated to different levels of public authority, 
and the mixed or hybrid forms these may take in 
different contexts. In no cases are these questions 
settled once and for all; indeed, the temporal and 
spatial characteristics of economies based on exploit-
ing enclaves of natural resources seem only to add 
increased vexation and the possibility of violence to 
these contests (see, for example, Watts 2004). Devo-
lution and provincial autonomy — or ‘federalism’ 
— were some of the most contentious topics in the 
lead-up to Solomon Islands’ independence in 1978. 
Although the resource-rich provinces — Western 
and Guadalcanal — have persisted in their push for 
devolution, power, resources and status have con-
tinued to shift in favour of the national government 
and national members of parliament. While a draft 
federal Constitution (2013) contains significant ben-
efit-sharing concessions to provinces (which would 
become ‘states’), as well as to proposed ‘community 
governments’, in relation to large-scale mining devel-
opments, it seems highly unlikely that constitutional 
change will occur in the foreseeable future.
One approach that explicitly recognises these 
scalar tensions is to establish a ‘multi-stakeholder 
forum’ representing different local, regional, and 
national interests. In the mining and oil and gas sec-
tors in PNG for example, the ‘Development Forum’ 
has helped to open up the negotiation process to a 
wide range of stakeholders, at different scales, that 
have various levels of political and technical capabili-
ty and draw upon different kinds of legitimacy (Filer 
2008). The Development Forum grants formal nego-
tiating rights to representatives of customary land-
owners, as well as to provincial and local govern-
ments, and results in the signing of Memoranda of 
Agreement that are reviewed every five years under 
the oversight of the PNG Mineral Resources Author-
ity. In the PNG case, the proportion of mineral reve-
nues flowing to ‘project landowners’ and provincial- 
and local-level governments has steadily increased 
with each successive Development Forum agree-
ment, and provincial governments have been able to 
extract a raft of concessions including royalties, equi-
ty, and various types of grants and transfers from the 
national government (Filer 2008:143). The Develop-
ment Forum could be seen as a durable institution 
for managing and regulating the scalar struggles that 
lie at the heart of mineral-resource development, or 
in other words, a ‘scalar fix’ meaning ‘an institutional 
compromise amongst various social actors at multi-
ple scales’ (Huber and Emel 2009:375). Returning to 
Solomon Islands, no comparable scalar fix currently 
exists, meaning that provincial governments will 
continue to be disempowered in the mineral devel-
opment and benefit-sharing process vis-a-vis land-
owners and the national government.
Building national capacity through external 
partnerships 
The challenges posed by transnational mining in 
Solomon Islands underscore the severe shortcom-
ings of any notion that the country should — far 
less, might be able to — bear sole responsibility for 
successfully negotiating mutually acceptable min-
ing agreements, regulating the deals over time, and 
debating and deciding how the proceeds should 
be distributed. The particular challenges posed 
by Solomon Islands geography, skill base, politics 
and recent history of conflict aside, that the global 
nature of mining requires a response beyond the 
national borders is increasingly apparent. 
The agreements reached between Solomon 
Islands and donor partners have been evolving over 
the past decade. Whether the gains recorded in 
health and education service delivery, infrastructure 
provision, or economic governance reflect simply 
the weight of aid and technical assistance or lasting 
changes in Solomon Islands’ service delivery capac-
ity is a matter for debate. But in the short term, 
the key parties — including Solomon Islanders at 
large — have profited from these agreements made 
for a range of humanitarian, security, diplomatic, 
and development purposes. Development part-
ners, notably Australia, are inevitably playing a role 
‘in the co-production of sovereignty in Solomon 
Islands’ (Barbara 2014; see also Craig and Porter 
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2013). They will continue to be in a unique position 
with the power and responsibility to influence the 
impacts of foreign investment in mining through 
their aid and foreign policies, while helping govern-
ment and civil society to manage the implications of 
a transition to an increased prominence for mining 
in the economy and in society at large. On its face, 
the move by metropolitan neighbours to amalgam-
ate the foreign affairs and aid arms of government, 
and to elevate economic diplomacy and trade inter-
ests, present an opportunity for Solomon Islands 
stakeholders to seek practical assistance from the 
country’s partners for dealing with foreign inves-
tors, especially those investors that are registered in 
neighbouring countries with a clear stake in pro-
moting prosperity and peace in Solomon Islands.
Prospects and Conclusions
On assuming office after the November 2014 elec-
tions the government led by the Democratic Coa-
lition for Change undertook to comprehensively 
review the policies, laws and performance of govern- 
ment in relation to mining and, in tandem, commit-
ted to a thorough review of legislation governing 
the role of subnational government in central–local 
relations and in that context make progress on long-
standing commitments to constitutional review. Our 
survey here of the likely political economic effects of 
large-scale mining, even at the relatively limited  
scale of two to three operations over the next decade,  
points to the kinds of issues that will need to be 
tackled across this policy ambit. While Solomon 
Islands is extreme in its diversity — the situation and 
prospects in Isabel appear, for instance, to be striking-
ly different from Temotu or Rennell — the contex-
tual causes of resource-management problems are 
common across the country. The litany is familiar: 
lack of community trust, cohesion, and cooperation 
in dealing with foreign intrusions involving natural 
resources and monetary compensation; the disarray, 
corruption and marginalisation of provincial govern-
ments; and the comprehensive failure of national 
regulatory and technical agencies to plan, or to con-
trol or discipline company activities. 
Missing from this three-level litany of gaps, 
lacks and deficits, however, is any real sense of 
agency or of the purposive exercise of ‘goodwill’ 
that oils relationships between parties: landowners, 
national and subnational governments and com-
mercial actors both local and global. In an impor-
tant sense this is what needs to be foregrounded 
between this vista of local fragmentation and inabil-
ity to garner collective positions, on the one hand, 
and on the other, the blizzard of compromised gov-
ernmental decisions that have produced overlapping 
concessions, and badly crafted and routinely unen-
forced agreements. Failures of governance, whether 
community, state or corporate, have been exploited 
and exacerbated by the skill of middle men who 
have established control of the incentive system. 
The situation reported by Hughes and Tuhanuku 
(2015) on Rennell is common elsewhere, including 
in Solomon Islands’ own experience with logging, 
where chiefs and landowners have allowed a small 
number of relatively educated Rennellese men, flu-
ent in written and spoken English to dominate con-
versations, and to exclude others who might have 
questioned the financial and other assumptions on 
which the deals were supposedly based. 
In this context, the socially generative prospects 
of efforts to provide the public with reliable infor-
mation, expert technical and financial advice, and 
indeed legislative backing to make this mandatory, 
are enticing. Rennell may be contrasted with the 
situation on Isabel, where the active involvement of 
expert individual and institutional advisers is said to 
be levelling up the bargaining positions in favour of 
landowners (Baines 2015). These kinds of interven-
tion are also attractive because they appear to pro-
ject forward a pathway of incremental, ‘results-ori-
ented’ institutional adjustments, and for the would-
be reformer or donor, the prospect of sequencing 
and steps to be taken with reasonable assurance that 
attention to managerial details will be rewarded. 
Any efforts to shift the current state of affairs in the 
direction of more ‘informed consent’ — for exam-
ple, through special purpose information and advi-
sory services — must be welcomed. But at the same 
time, we think it important to be alert to the conceit 
on which it is based, namely that adjustments to 
institutional arrangements (to promote voice, infor-
mation, choice, and so on) will prompt shifts in the 
pre-existing dispositions people bring to transac-
tions, to the agreements that elite actors are pre-
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pared to make to invest in capable public-serving 
authorities and, ultimately, work their way down 
into the underlying political settlement needed to 
sustain ‘institutional reforms’ at the surface. 
We think this implausible. Not just because, like 
Droogan and Waldek (2015:286), we find ‘any inter-
ventionist attempt to reshape Solomon Islands soci-
ety to more closely fit international preconditions 
to foreign investment to be largely problematic and 
undesirable’. Nor because, in Rennell, as many locali-
ties elsewhere in Solomon Islands, the logic that sees 
the provision of information and substantive advice 
leading to informed decisions presumes degrees 
of local trust, cooperation and perceived common 
interest to support collective action — whether this 
be on the basis of landowner identities or an ‘affect-
ed communities’ basis — that are currently absent. 
But more fundamentally, such conceit fails to stand 
scrutiny by scholarship on how institutional changes 
become socially embedded. As most versions of the 
political settlement/post-conflict transition literature 
tell us, getting the kinds of settlements that promote 
inclusive compacts that are capable of durably pro-
ducing public good outcomes depends on a centrali-
sation of power, pacts between political and eco-
nomic elites, and as an expression of this, agreement 
to invest in the institutions of public authority. 
A measure of threat and palpable risk creates 
important stimuli for elite pacts to be formed and 
power to be concentrated (Khan 2010; Slater 2010). 
To return to Rennell, the hostaging of mining com-
pany equipment by dissatisfied landowners and 
community leaders appears to have turned extreme 
remoteness to advantage and sent powerful signals 
to Honiara and, in that case, Jakarta and Melbourne, 
that although Rennell is a tiny political individual in 
a highly scattered and lightly governed country, and 
although for a time loggers and miners have been 
able to make their own rules and get away with it, 
it might not prove to be an easy ‘reach and extract’ 
proposition in the long run. From threats pacts 
might grow. But standing in front of this prospect 
are several deep cleavages between economic and 
political elites and, in Solomon Islands, these are 
further entrenched by ethnicity. 
Many observers of Solomon Islands, inside and 
out, bemoan that goodwill is too often monetary, and 
is intensely transactional (for a recent example, see 
Droogan and Waldek 2015). In other words, ‘client-
age’ (Tilly 2005), the glue in political settlements that 
must necessarily involve a combination of elite polit-
ical and economic interest (Khan 2010), is narrow 
and single in its dimension. This form of clientage 
everywhere produces instability, but it has particu-
larly corrosive effects in Solomon Islands (Craig and 
Porter 2014:15–16). Elsewhere, clientage is seldom 
reducible to a monetary exchange but is cemented 
through intermarriage, joint business and crony 
arrangements and the regular exchange of sons and 
relatives between the regime of politics and commer-
cial alliances. In Uganda, Rwanda, Indonesia, South 
Korea and Malaysia, the same people rule politically 
and economically. In Solomon Islands, whilst the 
number of political leaders with private sector expe-
rience has increased (Corbett and Wood 2013), and 
while threat of sabotage or hostaging of mining com-
pany assets and equipment may prompt new alliances 
between political and commercial elites, the ethnic 
cleavage will continue to stymie non-monetary forms 
of clientage (Craig and Porter 2014:16). 
This conclusion suggests three more, for dis-
cussion. First, we believe that the combination of 
political and economic interest that is so necessary 
for institutional and other remedial policies to gain 
traction will continue to be elusive (Craig and Por-
ter 2014; Khan 2010:1). Second, on a day-to-day 
basis, ‘goodwill’ will continue to be transactional, 
and thus continue to both corrode public institu-
tions and stymie incentives for elites to make politi-
cal investments in making institutions more effec-
tive and legitimate. And third, this configuration 
of political settlements and institutional practices, 
norms and incentives makes us highly sceptical 
about the ability of external actors to instrumental-
ise choices that need to be made locally in respect 
of any of the three areas of pressing need for action 
identified above. This is not simply because they 
are likely to be seen as interfering and paternalistic, 
such than any official worth his/her salt will avoid 
being associated with such efforts, but because, as 
retrospectives on RAMSI’s experience make abun-
dantly clear (for example Porter et al. 2015), the dis-
position of Solomon Islands politics and institutions 
we have described means that external interven-
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tions will inadvertently blunt domestic incentives to 
respond to local demands or public interests. 
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Endnotes
1 A 2010 study by the World Bank estimated that in 2008, 
the government missed out on the equivalent of 18 per 
cent of its annual revenue due to ad hoc concessions and  
tax and customs evasion. That was about as much as was 
received from log taxes and equivalent to around 80 per  
cent of government spending on education, the biggest 
item in the budget (World Bank 2010). A recent report 
found that ‘all the 100 or so logging companies in Solo-
mon Islands report loss-making operations for tax pur- 
poses. There is no independent audit of operational or 
financial information. Inspection of shipments is cursory 
if it occurs at all, and disputes are commonly settled by 
application of goodwill’ (Hughes and Tuhanuku 2015:7–8).
2 What became known as the ‘ethnic tension’ began in 
late 1998, when young Guadalcanal militants calling 
themselves the Isatabu Freedom Movement initiated 
a violent campaign that led to the eviction of around 
35,000, mainly Malaitan, migrant-settlers from their 
homes in areas east and west of Honiara. A rival group, 
the Malaita Eagle Force emerged in 1999, established a  
‘joint operation’ with the Malaita-dominated paramili-
tary Police Field Force, and staged a de facto coup 
in June 2000. Despite a series of peace agreements 
and accords, culminating in the Townsville Peace 
Agreement of 2001, the country remained militarised 
with significant pockets of unrest and lawlessness, 
until the deployment of RAMSI in July 2003.
3 For example, historian Judith Bennett described the 
Mamaloni government of 1994–1997 as ‘the loggers’ 
government’ (2000:246). During his earlier term 
as prime minister, between 1990 and 1993, 11 of 
Mamaloni’s 15 cabinet members were directors of 
logging companies, as was Mamaloni himself. His 
company, Somma, was said to have profited SB$4.3 
million due to tax exemptions awarded by his own 
government in 1995 (Bennett 2000:340–41, 346).
4 In 1994, SIFIA played a key role in toppling a 
government set on reforming the logging industry 
by stockpiling and holding back log exports, thus 
critically affecting the country’s balance of payments. 
SIFIA continues to lobby the government to prevent 
changes to The Forestry Act 1999 and to keep the 
‘Determined Value’ of logs — effectively the price 
upon which export taxes are paid in order to prevent 
‘transfer pricing’ — artificially low (see Allen 2011).
5 An important exception to this is the bauxite mining 
that has been taking place on Rennell. This mining 
occurs at multiple sites and involves bulldozing the 
top layer of soil and shipping it offshore. In this 
manner it is more akin to logging. Indeed, one of the 
two companies that have been involved in mining 
in Rennell, Asia Pacific Investment Development 
Limited, has also been involved in logging operations 
in Solomon Islands (Treasury Timber Ltd v Asia 
Pacific Investment Development Ltd 2014 [2014] 
SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 318 of 2013).
6 This has occurred in the case of Gold Ridge mine. 
St Barbara, which owned the mine from 2012 until 
its transfer to a ‘landowner’ company in May 2015, 
repeatedly requested that SIG secure the mine site from 
incursions by ‘illegal’ artisanal miners. Despite engaging 
private security contractors, the ongoing presence of 
these miners in the mine pits and escalating security 
concerns following the floods of April 2014 were cited 
by the company as contributing factors to its decision to 
close the operation indefinitely in August 2014.
7 Importantly, collective action at the scale of the island 
can paper over important cultural and socioeconomic 
differences within islands, some of which may actually 
be accentuated by mining (Regan 1998; Allen 2012).
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